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Abstract: 
This study analyzes which firms leave multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) for corporate social 
responsibility. Based on an analysis of all active and delisted participants from the UN Global 
Compact between 2000 and 2015 (n= 15,853), we find that SMEs are more likely to be delisted than 
larger and publicly-listed firms; that early adopters face a higher risk of being delisted; and that the 
presence of a local network in a country reduces the likelihood of being delisted. We theorize that 
MSIs face a participant self-selection bias over time and that local networks enable legitimacy 
spillover effects that prevent firms from exiting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are increasingly seen as a means of addressing social and 
environmental problems in areas such as human and labor rights, deforestation, and climate change. 
MSIs reflect voluntary predefined rules that seek to guide, assess, verify and communicate firms’ 
social and environmental performance (Fransen & Kolk, 2007). Prominent MSIs include the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Equator Principles. Although these 
initiatives differ in terms of their aims and underlying mechanisms, they all rest on a collaborative 
approach towards (global) governance. Within MSIs the authority for designing and enforcing relevant 
rules is shared between different interest groups, which, as a whole, cross the state/non-state and 
profit/non-profit-boundaries (Rasche, 2012). Typical stakeholder groups that participate in MSIs 
include businesses, NGOs, unions, governments, and international organizations.  
 
Our paper is motivated by the large bodies of research related to MSIs. This literature originates 
from different academic disciplines such as geography (Eden, 2009), political science (Bartley, 2014), 
development studies (Barrientos & Smith, 2007), and management studies (Reinecke et al., 2012). 
While the debate hardly cuts across these disciplines, existing studies have allowed us to gain a good 
understanding of why firms join MSIs (Fransen & Burgoon, 2014), how these initiatives become 
institutionalized (Gulbrandsen, 2014), what influences their perceived legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 
2012), and whether or not MSIs have an impact on the issues they are claiming to address (Berliner & 
Prakash, 2015). Surprisingly little analysis has been devoted to what sort of firms leave MSIs and why 
they are leaving (see e.g. Knudsen, 2011). As MSIs reflect voluntary governance arrangements, actors 
can end their engagement, either because they want to exit or because they are forced to leave. The 
aim of this article is to study what sort of firms leave MSIs. We are interested in exploring the 
characteristics of those firms that decide to leave MSIs. Our data do not allow us to discuss why firms 
are leaving MSIs, although we offer some theoretical thoughts and further research directions.  
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The empirical context for our study rests on an analysis of all active and delisted participants 
from one particular MSI, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), between 2000 and 2015 
(n=15,853). We selected the UNGC for three reasons. First, it is the world’s largest MSI in terms of 
the overall number of business participants that joined the initiative (more than 15,800 as of December 
2015). Second, it is also the initiative with the highest number of delisted firms (more than 7,000 as of 
December 2015). Finally, the UNGC is a global initiative with participants from more than 163 
countries and not restricted to any particular sector or firm size. Formally, firms leave the UNGC 
because they are either forced to do so after failure to submit a mandatory annual Communication on 
Progress (COP) report or because they decide to voluntarily withdraw from the initiative. Our study is 
concerned with the firms that leave, because they fail to submit a COP report. While our results cannot 
be generalized to all types of MSIs (e.g., initiatives that delist because of failed audits), the analysis 
enhances our knowledge about what sort of firms are (not) interested in initiatives with similar 
characteristics than the UNGC (e.g., the Principles for Responsible Investment).  
 
Studying what sorts of firms are delisted from an MSI is important for a number of reasons. 
First, it is hard to judge the output legitimacy of any MSI (i.e. whether a particular initiative offers an 
effective solution to the policy issues that are being addressed) without more specific knowledge about 
delistings. Mena and Palazzo (2010) argue that the number of participants that implement the rules 
underlying an MSI influences its output legitimacy. An analysis of delistings can show whether the 
impact of a specific initiative may be selective (e.g., focusing only on specific corporations). Second, 
an analysis of delisting behavior is also important for better understanding how MSIs are diffused over 
time. The delisting behavior of early and late adopters allows drawing conclusions about what type of 
firms drive the diffusion of MSIs at different stages of institutionalization (see e.g., Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983). Finally, we believe that studying what sort of firms leave MSIs also allows important insights 
into the design of MSIs as governance arrangements. Particularly the discussion of how to set and 
adjust entry and exit barriers (see e.g., Voegtlin & Pless, 2014) can be enriched by an analysis of 
delisting behavior.  
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Our analysis proceeds by reviewing existing literature on MSIs in general and the UNGC in 
particular. We then develop six hypotheses, which predict what makes delisting more/less likely in the 
context of the UNGC. Next, we explain what data we used, how we measured relevant variables, what 
statistical analyses we conducted, and how we checked the robustness of our results. The following 
section presents the results of our analysis. Based on this, we outline theoretical implications of our 
results and thus show how existing theory on MSIs can be extended. We also outline policy 
recommendations for MSIs in general and the UNGC in particular.  
 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES 
What Are Multi-stakeholder Initiatives?  
MSIs reflect voluntary initiatives, which involve public and private as well as profit and non-
profit actors (Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Rasche, 2012). Based on multi-
stakeholder processes, MSIs define, implement and enforce rules that direct firms’ social and 
environmental behavior in selected areas. Even though participation in MSIs is voluntary, firms are 
expected to comply with the underlying rules once they have signed up to a particular initiative. The 
literature distinguishes three types of MSIs in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (see 
e.g. Gilbert et al., 2011; Waddock, 2008): (1) principle-based MSIs – i.e. initiatives that define broad 
principles of engagement without any monitoring and certification (e.g., the UN Global Compact, the 
Principles for Responsible Investment, the Equator Principles); (2) certification MSIs – i.e. initiatives 
that outline criteria for certifying factories along global supply chains (e.g., the Forest Stewardship 
Council, Social Accountability 8000); and (3) reporting MSIs – i.e. initiatives that outline frameworks 
for disclosing non-financial information (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative, the Carbon Disclosure 
Project). Our study focuses on what sort of firms leave principle-based MSIs using the example of the 
UN Global Compact.  
 
The interdisciplinary academic discourse on MSIs has focused on different topics. First, a 
number of studies have looked at the “production” of MSIs. These studies have highlighted the 
political nature of standard-setting processes (Moog et al., 2015), the lack of inclusiveness of standard-
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making and governance (Boström, 2006), and the role of input legitimacy (Glasbergen, 2013). Second, 
a number of studies have looked at the “institutionalization” of selected MSIs, focusing, for instance, 
on how different actors influence patterns of diffusion (Gulbrandsen, 2014), the effects of competition 
between MSIs on market creation processes (Reinecke et al., 2012), and isomorphism among standard 
adopters (Manning & von Hagen, 2010). This stream of literature has also discussed possible benefits 
of adoption that drive institutionalization processes (Amer, 2015; Mouan, 2010). Finally, some studies 
have looked at the (lack of) “impact” of MSIs. Scholars have examined whether MSIs have any effect 
on the practices of participants (Clark & Kozar, 2011), while other studies have more directly 
researched MSIs’ impact on the problems they are claiming to address (Oosterveer et al., 2014). Some 
studies have highlighted that MSIs’ impact on social and environmental problems is questionable, as 
local practices are often incompatible with global standards (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). 
 
Depending on the type of MSI, there are different ways to exit: (1) Principle-based MSIs 
usually demand a mandatory annual disclosure of implementation progress from participants, non-
reporting participants are delisted; (2) Certification MSIs delist participants that fail to reach certain 
performance standards during audits; and (3) all types of MSIs allow that firms decide to voluntarily 
withdraw (e.g., by not renewing their membership). While we have plenty of knowledge about why 
firms join MSIs, we know little about what sort of firms leave MSIs and why they do so. We study 
what type of firms leave the UNGC and hence contribute to research on principle-based MSIs.  
 
The UN Global Compact 
The UNGC offers businesses the opportunity to voluntarily align their business practices with 
ten principles in four issue areas (i.e. human rights, labor rights, environmental protection, anti-
corruption). The ten principles are not tied towards a particular sector, region or type of corporation; 
rather, they are supposed to be universally valid (Kell, 2013). While the UNGC primarily aims at 
enlisting businesses in support of the ten principles, non-business actors (e.g., NGOs and unions) can 
also join the initiative. The UNGC has created rather low entry barriers. Corporations wishing to join 
have to send a Letter of Commitment (signed by the CEO) to the UN Secretary-General. Firms also 
	 7 
need to provide some basic information via an online application form (e.g., size of business, country). 
To support the contextualization of the ten principles and to generate local spaces for interaction, the 
UNGC has created so-called local networks. Such networks reflect “clusters of participants who come 
together voluntarily to advance the Global Compact and its Principles at the local level […] by 
providing on-the-ground support and capacity-building tied to distinct cultural, economic and 
linguistic needs” (Whelan, 2010: 318). So far, such networks have been established in over 100 
countries. UNGC participants can, but do not have to, join these networks.  
 
The UNGC does not monitor whether participants live up to their commitment. Rather, all 
business participants have to submit an annual Communication on Progress (COP) report in order to 
remain listed as “active”. The COP is considered to be a public document (available via the UNGC’s 
website) and its main purpose is to inform all stakeholders about a company’s efforts in support of the 
UNGC (Hamid & Johner, 2010). The content of COP reports is not verified by the UNGC. COP 
reports are not standardized and only need to meet certain minimum requirements. They need to 
include: (a) a statement by the chief executive expressing continued support, (b) a description of 
practical actions in support of the four issue areas (i.e. human rights, labor, environment, and anti-
corruption), and (c) a measurement of outcomes (UN Global Compact, 2017). If a participant does not 
address one or more of the four issue areas, it needs to explain the omission. Whenever a firm submits 
a COP, which does not meet the basic requirements, it is given a one-off, 12-month “grace period.” 
During this period, the participant is offered support and guidance to come up with an adequate COP. 
Participants, who do not submit a COP on time, are not immediately delisted. Rather, they are first 
labeled “non-communicating.” If a non-communicating participant does not submit a valid COP report 
within another 12 months of becoming non-communicating, it is finally delisted from the UNGC (UN 
Global Compact, 2017). Hence, it can take up to 36 months to delist a participant (initial 12 months of 
non-disclosure, plus 12 months grace period, plus 12 months non-communicating status). Other 
principle-based MSIs have adopted similar mechanisms and grace periods (e.g., the Equator 
Principles, the Principles for Responsible Investment). All expelled companies are listed on the UNGC 
website. Our analysis assumes that the decision to leave the UNGC is a deliberate one, either because 
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the firm does not want to (or cannot) produce the COP report or because it decided to voluntarily 
withdraw from the initiative. Prior to being delisted, participants receive a number of warnings from 
the Global Compact Office.  
 
A number of scholars have studied what impact the UNGC creates over time. Berliner and 
Prakash (2015) found that UNGC participation has no effect on companies’ human rights and 
environmental performance. By contrast, Schembera (2016) found that longer participation in the 
UNGC leads to higher levels of implementation of the ten principles. It is these conflicting findings 
that are at the heart of the heated debate around whether the UNGC is a useful framework to advance 
CSR (Rasche, 2009). Despite the public nature of delistings and their high relevance for the UNGC, 
surprisingly little research has focused on what sort of firms leave the initiative and why they do so. 
Knudsen’s (2011) early analysis of delistings provided some valuable insights. She found that 
participants operating in countries with stronger domestic governance institutions were less likely to 
delist. Further, she found that participants from Eastern Europe and Africa have a higher likelihood of 
being delisted, while firms from the oil and gas sector were less likely to be delisted. Although these 
results give important initial directions, they also need to be treated with care, as the underlying 
dataset included only 227 firms that were delisted during the first six months of 2008. As we are 
working with a dataset of the full population (i.e. all active and delisted participants from 2000-2015), 
the conclusions that can be drawn from this study leave no concern for sample significance.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate Size 
We can expect that the size of a corporate participant affects his ability and willingness to 
submit a COP report in at least three ways. First, submitting a COP report requires resources. When 
signing up to the UNGC corporations have to undergo some degree of change that requires financial 
as well as non-financial resources (Rasche et al., 2013). For instance, firms have to collect and analyze 
relevant data and also write up the annual COP report. Companies with limited resources will face 
difficulties in developing and submitting such a report and hence can be expected to face a higher 
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likelihood of being delisted. SMEs have on average fewer resources available to manage their 
commitment to CSR (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), and hence should face a higher likelihood of being 
delisted. Second, the degree of required organizational change also depends on the already existing 
CSR engagement of a participant. Companies, which were already engaged in CSR reporting prior to 
their commitment to the UNGC, can submit these reports as a COP. This is due to the flexible COP 
policy of the UNGC. As CSR reporting is particularly widespread among larger corporations but still 
not significantly developed among smaller firms (KPMG, 2015), we can expect that SMEs face a 
higher likelihood of being delisted, as many smaller firms would have to create a new reporting 
infrastructure from scratch. Finally, the existence of reputational risk can shape participants’ 
willingness to comply with the UNGC’s COP policy. Especially larger firms get more critical 
attention from stakeholders than smaller firms do (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The more visible a 
company is to relevant stakeholders, the higher its potential reputational risk (e.g., in case of NGO 
activism; see also Brown & Knudsen, 2012). Larger firms thus have more incentives to comply with 
the COP policy, as they are more likely to face adverse reputational effects when being delisted, 
especially since delistings are publicly communicated. All of the above leads us to hypothesize:   
 
Hypothesis 1: SMEs are more likely to be delisted from the UNGC than larger companies.  
 
We can expect that the hypothesized effects of organization size on a firm’s ability and 
willingness to submit a COP report are particularly strong for well-known global firms. Hence, we 
include an analysis of the delisting status of the Financial Times (FT) Global 500 firms. These 
companies are ranked by market capitalization. FT 500 firms have significant resources devoted to 
CSR and usually also a well-developed CSR infrastructure (e.g., dedicated departments; Baumann-
Pauly et al., 2013). Also, FT 500 firms are disproportionally exposed to reputational risk and hence 
remain the main target of NGO campaigning (Sigwatch, 2016). We, therefore, hypothesize:  
  
Hypothesis 2: FT 500 firms are less likely than other participants to be delisted from the 
UNGC.  
	 10 
 
Listing Status 
We expect that participants’ listing status affects the likelihood of being delisted. In particular, 
we believe that publicly listed firms will behave differently than privately held firms. Prior research 
has shown that publicly listed companies that fail to submit a COP report are penalized by financial 
markets with an average cumulative abnormal return of -1.6% over a period of 5 trading days (Amer, 
2015). Investors seem to be aware of delistings and are prepared to punish non-communicating 
companies (e.g., because of higher perceived risk levels). This is not surprising, as the status of COP 
reports is available to investors via the Bloomberg Professional service, which is one of the most 
widely used platforms for financial professionals worldwide. Larger institutional investors can 
influence companies’ attitude towards UNGC commitment, as participating companies depend on 
their financial resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Over 1,500 institutional investors have signed up 
to the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) thereby promising to integrate CSR-related 
concerns into their investment decisions. Although the PRI has not yet shown large-scale impact 
(Gond & Piani, 2013), it can be expected that at least some PRI investors monitor the COP status of 
publicly listed UNGC participants. This exposes publicly listed firms to higher degrees of risk in the 
event of being delisted.  
 
Further, Shiu & Yang (2017) recently argued that publicly listed firms, which engage in CSR 
activities, benefit from insurance-like effects if negative events occur. However, such effects only 
exist if firms can credibly signal their CSR commitment to markets (e.g., through COP reporting). 
Delisting from the UNGC would undercut such signaling effects. Prior research has also shown that 
CSR reporting decreases the costs of equity capital for listed firms (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Reverte, 
2012). Being delisted from the UNGC for failure to report on implementation progress would thus 
increase the risk of higher capital costs. These insights lead us to hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Publicly listed firms are less likely than other firms to be delisted from the 
UNGC.  
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Early and Late Adopters 
The UNGC’s delisting rate is also likely to be influenced by when participants joined the 
initiative. Institutional theorists have studied how timing affects the rationale of adopting a practice. 
They have claimed that adoption is a function of the degree of institutionalization. Tolbert and 
Zucker’s (1983) model suggests that early adopters are motivated by gains in efficiency, while late 
adopters comply with an institutionalized practice in order to appear legitimate. Building on these 
insights, scholars have argued that late adopters are less likely to show substantive implementation and 
hence are more likely to decouple (Edelman, 1992; Westphal et al., 1997). Delisting, however, does 
not necessarily imply policy-practice decoupling, because a participant’s status as active/delisted does 
not necessarily correspond to the level of implementation. As the content of COP reports is not 
externally verified, it is possible that “active” participants decouple their commitment from actual 
implementation (but try to hide behind a well-written report). At the same time, it is also possible that 
“delisted” participants still comply with the ten principles (but decided not to submit a report).  
 
We believe that in the case of the UNGC it is more reasonable to assume that early adopters 
face a higher likelihood of being delisted than late adopters. Early adopters were particularly interested 
in gaining legitimacy, as the UNGC provided the unique opportunity to officially partner with the UN. 
In its early days, the UNGC stressed the “moral case” for joining the initiative (Rasche & Kell, 2010). 
This case was based on the belief that the UN, as an international organization with high levels of trust 
and moral authority, can help businesses to become more responsible (Coleman, 2003). However, as 
the UNGC was in many ways an institutional experiment, early adopters also faced high levels of 
uncertainty around what exactly they were committing to. For instance, the UNGC changed many of 
its engagement opportunities in the early days (e.g., the first local network was not launched until 
2003). By contrast, we can expect that late adopters have more knowledge about what the initiative is 
all about, whether it is of potential value to the organization, and whether it is possible to meet the 
minimum disclosure requirement. Based on these insights, we hypothesize that:  
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Hypothesis 4: Early adopters are more likely than late adopters to be delisted from the 
UNGC. 
 
Participants from Countries with Legislation on CSR Reporting  
The COP report, which participants have to submit on an annual basis, is in many cases not 
specifically prepared for the UNGC. Due to the initiative’s flexible reporting requirements (UN 
Global Compact, 2017), many firms submit their already existing CSR reports (or use the data from 
these reports for their COP). Hence, we can expect that participants from countries with existing 
mandatory regulations around CSR reporting are less likely to be delisted. CSR reporting, also 
referred to as environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting, sustainability reporting or non-
financial reporting, is either mandated through governmental regulation or is a listing requirement on 
selected stock exchanges (KPMG et al., 2016). For instance, China and Brazil, two countries with a 
high number of UNGC participants, have CSR reporting regulation for listed companies. There is 
continued strong growth of regulation in this area, both within and also outside of OECD countries. 
We only include countries, which have legally binding regulation on CSR reporting, into our analysis. 
Countries with “softer” forms of regulation (e.g., via stock exchanges) are excluded, as the scope of 
these regulations is usually very limited (i.e. in most cases only applicable to certain firms listed on a 
specific stock exchange).  
 
Hypothesis 5: Companies from countries where CSR reporting is required by law have a 
lower share of delisted firms from the UNGC. 
 
Strength of Local Networks  
Local networks act as a bridge between the abstract idea of the UNGC on the global level and 
the concrete realities that firms face in their national context. Prior research has suggested that the 
level of engagement with a particular local network is dependent upon the number of network 
participants (Rasche, 2012; Whelan, 2010). Local networks with more participants are likely to have 
access to more resources (e.g., because they can charge local fees) and hence show higher levels of 
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engagement. As UNGC participants are not forced to join the local network in their respective 
country, we can expect networks with a high rate of participation to also show higher levels of activity 
(e.g., because they have access to more interested firms). Some networks, which show higher levels of 
engagement, support their participants in creating COP reports. The 2014 Local Networks Report by 
the UNGC states that “local networks received in-depth training and guidance to support their 
participants with issues related to reporting and fulfilling their COP […] requirements.” (UN Global 
Compact, 2014: 14). For instance, the Argentinean, German and Swiss local networks offered such 
assistance. We can therefore expect that network strength (i.e. networks with higher levels of 
participation and hence engagement) influences participants’ willingness and ability to submit a COP. 
Based on this, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Firms operating in countries with local networks that attract a high share of 
participants have a lower share of delisted firms from the UNGC.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Dataset 
Our analysis is based on the complete dataset of the UNGC’s active and delisted participants as 
of 31 December 2015 (n=15,853). The Global Compact Office in New York provided the dataset. We 
excluded participants, which joined between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2015, as due to the 
UNGC’s current COP policy, firms that joined during these years cannot be delisted (UN Global 
Compact, 2017). A firm that joined on 1 January 2013 cannot be delisted before 1 January 2016 due to 
the current submission deadlines and available “grace periods.” Our analysis therefore includes all 
participants that joined the UNGC before 1 January 2013, and that were either labeled “active” or 
“delisted” by December 2015. This results in a sample of 11,815 firms for our analysis.  
 
Overall, the UNGC delisted 7,017 firms until December 2015. Of these the vast majority were 
expelled for failure to submit a COP (84.81%), while only a minority was delisted because of 
voluntary withdrawal (11.33%). For instance, Volkswagen voluntarily withdrew from the initiative in 
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2015 after its scandal around the manipulation of diesel engines. Only 3.62% of delisted participants 
were expelled because they merged with another company or because the company seized to exist. We 
only include companies in the analyses that were expelled from the UNCG because they failed to 
submit a COP report, resulting in a final sample size of 10,749 firms (i.e. all firms that joined before 1 
January 2013 and that were listed “active” or that were “delisted” due to non-reporting).  
 
Variables and Statistical Analyses 
Variables. The variable of interest is whether a firm is delisted or not from the UNGC. We 
create a dummy variable that is employed as the dependent variable. The following independent 
variables are used according to our generated hypotheses:  
 
• SMEs (H1): We define SMEs as all companies with less than 250 employees according to an 
official recommendation by the EU (EU 2003/361/EC); micro enterprises (i.e. firms with less 
than 10 employees) were included into the SME category (dummy). Such a classification is in 
line with prior empirical work on SMEs (see e.g., Berliner & Prakash, 2012).   
• FT500 (H2): We defined FT500 as a dummy variable (UNGC participant is/is not listed in the 
Financial Times Global 500 as of December 2015). 
• Listing Status (H3): The variable concerns the publicly listed status of a participating firm and 
was defined as a dummy (1 = “publicly listed”, 0 = “private company, subsidiary, or state-
owned company”).  
• Time that participants joined (H4): We defined a dummy variable (1 = “early adopters” who 
joined the UNGC prior to and including 2008, 0 = “late adopters” who joined after 2008). We 
chose 2008 as a cut-off year, as the UNGC had gained a robust membership base until then 
(6,207 participants until the end of 2008). The UNGC started out with 50 firms in 2000 and 
grew especially in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (as participants from China and India started to join).  
• Existence of CSR reporting legislation (H5): We defined a dummy variable regarding whether 
CSR reporting legislation was in place (dummy, 1 = “legislation was in place when firm 
joined UNGC”). The information whether or not a country has CSR reporting legislation in 
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place was obtained from a comprehensive overview of reporting legislation published by 
KPMG, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), and the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa (KPMG et al., 2016). A country 
was only coded as having reporting legislation in place if legally binding measures existed 
(i.e. non-binding recommendations were not considered).  
• Strength of local networks (H6): We defined a variable describing the existence and strength 
of a local network in a particular country (0 = “no network or no information available”; 1 = 
“weak network defined as less than 70% of country participants are organized in the 
network”;  and 2 = “strong network defined as at least 70% of country participants are 
organized in the network”). We chose 70% as a threshold for a network to be classified as 
weak or strong, as most networks above this threshold showed a high level of activity and 
participant engagement (UN Global Compact, 2015).  
 
As control variables, we include dummies of countries, industry sectors and whether a country is an 
OECD member or not.  
 
Logistic regression. After descriptive analyses, we employ logistic regression analyses to test 
the effects of the various independent variables on delisting. We estimate the following model:  
 𝐷! =  𝛽! + 𝛽′!𝑋! + 𝛽′!𝐶! + 𝜀!     (1) 
 
where Di is the measure of whether firm i is delisted or active. β0 is the average outcome. Xi captures 
all independent variables relevant for testing the hypotheses and Ci comprises dummies for the 
industry sectors. εi is the individual error-term. β' is the vector of key coefficients of interest.  
 
Multilevel mixed-effects generalized linear model (MMGLM). We then control for contextual 
effects such as shared environments by employing a multilevel mixed-effects generalized linear 
model. The UNGC database has a nested structure with two levels: country and firms. In such a 
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sample, the individual firm observations are generally not independent as firms within one country are 
subject to national legislation and other national factors (Hox, 2002). The estimated model looks as 
follows: 
 𝐷!" =  𝛽!! + 𝛽′!𝑋!" + 𝛽′!𝐶!" + 𝜀!"    (2) 𝛽!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑂! + 𝜗!! (country level) 
 
where Dij is the measure of whether firm i in country j is delisted or active. β0j is the average outcome 
in country j which is equal to the sum of the population average (β0), the country specific effect (υ0j) 
and the effect of being an OECD member (O0). Xij captures all independent variables relevant for 
testing the hypotheses and Cij comprises dummies for the industry sectors. εi is the individual error-
term. The composite model looks as follows: 
 𝑫𝒊𝒋= 𝜷𝟎+ 𝜷!𝟏𝑿𝒊𝒋+𝜷!𝟐𝑪𝒊𝒋+ 𝜷𝟑𝑶+𝝑𝟎𝒋+ 𝜺𝒊𝒋   (3) 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Results 
Hypotheses H1 to H6 are tested by descriptive statistics with the final sample of 10,749 firms. 
The findings are presented in Table 1. Hypothesis H1 suggests that SMEs are more likely to be 
delisted than larger firms. In total, 6,325 SMEs were listed in the UNGC whereof 67.37% were 
delisted between 2000 and 2012. For larger firms, 38.20% were delisted over the same period of time. 
Hence, the share of delisted SMEs is much larger than the one of participants with more than 250 
employees (+29.17%, Table, last column) – supporting H1. Hypothesis H2 suggests that FT500 firms 
are less likely to be delisted from the UNGC than other participants. This hypothesis is supported. Out 
of all UNGC participants, 184 firms were listed in the FT500. Only 0.54% of these 184 firms were 
delisted, while the delisting rate of non-FT500 firms is at 56.31%. H3 predicts that publicly listed 
firms are less likely than other firms to be delisted from the UNGC. We find support for this 
fixed effects random effects 
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hypothesis, as publicly listed firms have a lower share of delisted firms (20.51%) than firms with other 
ownership structures (59.46%) – supporting H3.  
 
================= 
Put Table 1 About Here 
================= 
 
Hypothesis H4 suggests that late adopters are less likely to be delisted than early adopters – this 
is supported by the data. We find that early adopters are more likely to be delisted than late adopters 
(+23.96%). Hypothesis H5 suggests that firms, which operated in countries with CSR reporting 
legislation in place when they joined the UNGC, are less likely to be delisted. We find weak support 
for this hypothesis. While 53.55% of firms from countries with CSR legislation in place were delisted, 
58.67% of firms from countries without any CSR legislation in place were delisted (Table 1). 
Excluding SMEs from the analyses (as CSR reporting legislation usually targets larger firms), we find 
that 37.43% of the 2,821 larger firms that were exposed to CSR legislation were delisted, while 
39.55% of the 1,603 larger firms that were not subject to such legislation were delisted. Hence, 
looking only at larger firms, the picture is not much different from the overall effect on all firms. 
Hypothesis H6 is about the supportive nature of local networks, suggesting that firms operating in 
countries where a high number of participants are organized in the network face a lower likelihood of 
being delisted. This hypothesis is only weakly supported. While the delisting rate for firms that 
operate in countries without any network is high (74.14%), the share is much lower for weak and 
strong networks, 48.59% and 54.59% respectively.  
 
Regression Results 
Table 2 presents the regression results – both, the logistic regression (Logit, Column (1)) as well 
as the multilevel mixed-effects generalized linear model (MMGLM, Column (2)), produce similar 
results for all hypotheses but H6. For the interpretation of the estimates, we focus on the MMGLM as 
the multilevel model better reflects the structure of the data.  
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================= 
Put Table 2 About Here 
================= 
 
Also when controlling for all other variables that are hypothesized to be associated with being 
delisted or not, the descriptive results are largely confirmed. For example, SMEs have a higher 
likelihood of being delisted compared to larger firms (Odds Ratio OR = 3.437), meaning that the 
likelihood of being delisted is 3.437 times higher compared to the likelihood of a larger firm being 
delisted. Another factor increasing the likelihood of delisting is being an early adopter (OR = 3.120). 
Firms with the following characteristics have a lower likelihood of being delisted: being listed in the 
FT 500, being a publicly listed firm or being in a country where legislation on CSR reporting is in 
place. Thus, the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are supported. 
 
For the effect of local networks on the likelihood of being delisted (H6), the estimates change 
largely when taking the two-level structure of the data (firm in country) into account. Taking weak 
local networks as the reference category, firms in countries with strong local networks are slightly 
more likely to be delisted (OR = 1.237), but firms in countries with no local networks are 3.384 times 
more likely to be delisted than are firms in countries with weak networks. Countries explain 7.83% of 
the variance of being delisted (ICC Intra Class Correlation coefficient).  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretical Implications 
Effects of firm size on MSI engagement. Our findings suggest that the ability and willingness of 
organizations to engage in COP reporting seems to be negatively correlated with firm size. This 
confirms prior theoretical insights that SMEs do not engage much in formal CSR reporting (see e.g., 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Gallo & Christensen, 2011). Rather, SMEs often choose informal reporting 
mechanisms such as face-to-face meetings with selected stakeholders (Spence, 2004). As principle-
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based MSIs, like the UNGC or the PRI, require annual reports from their participants, our results show 
that these initiatives are primarily designed for larger companies, which can cover the organizational 
costs of creating formal reporting mechanisms. This shows that the expected cost/benefit ratio of 
participating in principle-based MSIs is contingent upon firm size. On the one hand, SMEs face higher 
marginal costs of disclosure relative to larger companies. We can thus expect that SMEs are 
confronted with higher organizational barriers to remain part of principle-based MSIs. On the other 
hand, SMEs also find it more difficult to fully reap the benefits of principle-based MSIs. Although 
initiatives like the UNGC state that they welcome SMEs (Rasche & Kell, 2010), larger firms can 
better activate the benefits of participation, such as indicated by the lower delisting rate for FT 500 
firms. For instance, benefits such as reputational effects, being part of a platform for corporate 
political activity, and improved access to the UN system have a higher relevance for larger firms. A 
weak value proposition for SMEs does not ipso facto mean that these firms do not implement MSIs. 
Baumann-Pauly et al. (2013) even argue that SMEs face lower costs of integrating CSR practices into 
the organization (relative to larger firms), as coordination costs are lower and employees’ personal 
commitment is easier to secure. What the results show is that principle-based MSIs are not designed in 
a way that they offer enough value to SMEs for them to avoid delisting.  
 
Effects of join year on MSI engagement. So far, there is little longitudinal analysis of principle-
based MSIs (mostly due to a lack of relevant data). Our analysis suggests that late adopters face a 
lower likelihood of being delisted, while early adopters of the UNGC were delisted more often. 
Theoretically speaking, this points towards the existence of a self-selection bias. Over time, MSIs may 
attract those participants that know what they are getting into and that also know whether or not they 
can live up to the proposed principles. While in the early days of an MSI the participant base is still 
more heterogeneous, knowledge about what the initiative is (and is not) is (a) increasing and (b) 
diffusing over time. This makes the MSI attractive to a much narrower base of “informed” potential 
participants. We believe that this mechanism is likely to hold for principle-based MSIs in general, as 
these initiatives have low entry barriers and therefore attract a broad mix of participants in their early 
days. We can thus assume that principle-based MSIs run through an initial phase where delistings can 
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expected to be high, although this rate should decrease over time as participants gain more knowledge 
of the MSI. This insight shows the relevance of institutional-level learning (Haunschild & Chandler, 
2008). Late adopters learn from the delisting experiences of early adopters and adapt their behavior 
accordingly. A track record of successes and failures of prior adopters is available once a MSI’s 
diffusion has progressed. Based on this, potential adopters can better judge whether and how a certain 
initiative fits their needs. Such an explanation of adoption behavior later in the diffusion process is not 
yet sufficiently integrated into the MSI literature.   
 
Effects of local networks on MSI engagement. Our analysis shows that the mere existence of 
local networks influences the delisting rate, while the strength of a network (measured by the number 
of active participants) does not seem to affect delistings significantly. This finding calls into question 
existing MSI theory, which suggests that the presence of more participants in a local network 
increases the level of engagement (Rasche, 2012). Our findings suggest that the presence of a network 
is already sufficient to prevent participants from leaving MSIs. Local networks with many participants 
do not automatically show lower delisting rates. We argue that what keeps participants from leaving 
an MSI is the existence of legitimacy spillover effects from existing network participants to 
newcomers. Prior research has argued that “similarity” acts as a heuristic that allows outsiders to 
construct legitimacy transfers based on established categories (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kuilman & 
Li, 2009). Being part of a local network acts as such an established cognitive category, in that 
networks unite firms that are similar in terms of their support for the UNGC. Outside audiences thus 
confer legitimacy to UNGC participants based on whether they can typify them into a category of 
organizations that share a common feature (Haack et al., 2014). Leaving the UNGC would imply 
losing access to the local network and hence the perceived association with a similar class of 
organizations. Although participants in local networks are likely to differ in terms of their size and 
sector, they are all similar in terms of being perceived as working towards goals that are organized 
under the UN umbrella. As the UN enjoys high levels of trust and legitimacy (Torgler, 2008), we can 
expect that outsiders will confer legitimacy to organizations that they can typify into a recognized 
cognitive category (i.e. “local networks members”). We believe that such legitimacy spillovers are tied 
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to local networks, as these networks are the “face” of the UNGC on the local level and hence more 
known to local audiences. Understood in this way, the existence of local networks positively 
influences firms’ decision to remain part of the UNGC.   
 
Policy Recommendations  
Principle-based MSIs. Principle-based MSIs may be at risk of suffering from adverse selection. 
Low entry barriers and a high level of delisting are likely to damage the reputation and legitimacy of 
an initiative. The legitimacy of an MSI is hard to judge from the outside and by non-experts. Hence, 
evaluators will rely on heuristics (Haack et al., 2014). Publicly available information on delistings acts 
as such a heuristic and thus influences MSIs’ perceived legitimacy. In case of a high delisting rate, 
firms with a strong CSR profile will find it harder to credibly signal their performance. As a result, 
better performing companies may shy away from participation, as they expect negative legitimacy 
spillovers. For policy makers this implies (a) that it is important to sufficiently differentiate MSI 
participants within an initiative (e.g., through different levels of participation) and (b) to carefully 
adjust entry barriers. Currently, most principle-based MSIs have had rather low entry barriers. We 
suggest increasing entry barriers to a level that ensures that participants have a basic willingness to 
engage in the initiative and the necessary resources to do so. This could be done in different ways 
(e.g., by changing reporting requirements and asking for a sign-up fee). However, we also caution that 
entry barriers need to be set in a way that the respective MSIs are able to keep a diverse participant 
base. Club theory suggests that MSIs, which only attract CSR leaders, may be ineffective due to a lack 
of learning effects (Berliner & Prakash, 2014). Principle-based MSIs have to reward leaders, while, at 
the same time, allow laggards to ratchet up their performance.  
 
Our analysis also shows that MSIs enjoy lower delisting rates if they engage participants 
through local networks. The mere existence of a local network in a country can bring down the 
delisting rate. For policy makers this implies that investments into local networks are important. 
Participants are likely to find it hard to connect to a global initiative with a vast number of 
participants. Local networks allow for creating a collective identity on the ground, which is likely to 
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affect the perceived value of a MSI. MSIs should actively encourage and financially support the 
establishment of networks in countries where this has not been done yet (around 60 countries for the 
UNGC). Policy makers should also ensure that networks engage SMEs into smaller “regional 
clusters.” Larger, nation-wide networks do not offer much value to SMEs, whose CSR activities are 
usually embedded in local communities (Murillo & Lozano, 2006). This recommendation would be 
particularly relevant for larger and heterogeneous countries (e.g., China, India).  
 
UN Global Compact. One key recommendation based on our analysis would be to make COP 
reporting a condition for entering the UNGC instead of making it an outcome of participation. Our 
results suggest that a large number of firms do not seem to be interested in aligning their business 
practices and strategies with the UNGC’s ten principles. As it stands, these firms can remain part of 
the initiative for at least three years due to the flexible nature of the UNGC’s COP policy (UN Global 
Compact, 2017). Although it remains subject to further research why exactly these firms joined the 
UNGC in the first place, our results show that those who argue that a large number of firms misuse the 
initiative for “bluewashing” (Berliner & Prakash, 2015) may indeed have a point. Making the 
submission of a COP report a precondition for participation would slightly increase entry barriers and 
also offer a baseline from where to judge future implementation progress. The COP report could then 
outline how the ten principles are addressed at the time of joining, and what plans exist for the future. 
Such a policy change would also ensure that new participants have already gained some experience 
with reporting non-financial information and are aware of the required resources. Another possibility 
would be to label all companies, which have joined the UNGC but have not yet submitted a COP, as 
“candidates.”  
 
Our results also suggest that the UNGC currently has no mechanism in place that allows deviant 
companies to be punished. So far, the UNGC assumes that delisted firms are punished through the 
public nature of delistings – all expelled firms are listed on a “name and shame” board on the 
initiative’s website (Hamid & Johner, 2010). Our findings suggest that this mechanism is likely to 
influence larger publicly listed firms, while it does not show much effect on SMEs. As the exit option 
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is not costly for SMEs, and as delisted firms can reapply to the UNGC at any time, there are incentives 
for firms to free ride (i.e. join the initiative for three years without any reporting). We thus recommend 
requiring asset-specific investments from new participants. Such investments would at least partly 
address the problem of missing credible commitment, as they create sunk costs for participants and 
hence make the exit option more costly (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Practically speaking, such 
investments can be required by making participation in local networks mandatory. On the one hand, 
this would tighten the links between participants and the UNGC through more regular interactions. On 
the other hand, it would also require firms to participate in and contribute to collective action 
activities. As such activities are only accessible by network members, participants’ investment in them 
(either financial or non-financial) is hard to regain.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the growing attention to MSIs and their relevance to address social and environmental 
problems, it is crucial to better understand what types of firms are affected by this mode of 
governance. We contribute to the current debates by systematically analyzing what types of firms 
voluntarily leave a leading principle-based MSI, the UNGC. Our results show that firm size, join year 
and the existence of local networks influence whether firms decide to leave MSIs. We only find weak 
support for the impact of CSR reporting legislation on delisting behavior. Overall, our study shows 
that principle-based MSIs seem to face a dilemma. On the one hand, such initiatives are based on 
rather low entry barriers and hence attract a high number of participants. The high number of 
participants is needed to achieve the sustainability transformations that these initiatives promote. 
Former UN Secretary-General Ban, for instance, called for 20,000 UNGC participants by the year 
2020 (United Nations, 2011). On the other hand, low entry barriers also imply a high number of 
delistings. This simultaneous existence of strong participant growth and a high number of delistings 
calls the long-term “business model” of principle-based MSIs into question.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on hypotheses H1 – H6.  
 
Hypothesis Variable 
Summary 
statistics n Delisted Delta % 
H1 SMEs n 
(%) 
6,325 4,261 
(67.37%) 
+29.17% 
 Other n 
(%) 
4,424 1,690 
(38.20%) 
 
H2 FT 500 n 
(%) 
184 5 
(5.44%) 
-50.87% 
 Other firms n 
(%) 
10,560 5,946 
(56.31%) 
 
H3 Publicly listed firms n 
(%) 
1,131 232 
(20.51%) 
-38.36% 
 Other firms n 
(%) 
9,618 5,719 
(59.46%) 
 
H4 Early adopters n 
(%) 
5,787 3,844 
(66.42%) 
+23.96% 
 Late adopters n 
(%) 
4,962 2,107 
(42.46%) 
 
H5 Legislation existed n 
(%) 
6,936 3,714 
(53.55%) 
-5.12% 
 No legislation n 
(%) 
3,813 2,237 
(58.67%) 
 
H6 Strong network n 
(%) 
6,618 3,604 
(54.59%) 
-19.68%1 
 Weak network n 
(%) 
2,801 1,361 
(48.59%) 
-25.55%1 
 No network/ no 
information 
n 
(%) 
1,330 986 
(74.14%) 
 
Total  n 
(%) 
10,749 7,017 
(59.39%) 
 
Note: 1 Difference between variable and “no network/ no information” 
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Table 2: Logit/MMGLM estimates of H1 to H6 on being delisted from the UNGC 
Variables 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
MMGLM 
Hypothesis H1 
SMEs 3.75*** 3.44*** 
95% CI [3.090; 3.906] [3.061; 3.860] 
Other ref. ref. 
Hypothesis H2 
FT 500 0.02*** 0.02*** 
95% CI [0.002; 0.114] [0.002; 0112] 
Other firms ref. ref. 
Hypothesis H3 
Publicly listed firms 0.37*** 0.37*** 
95% CI [0.307; 0.454] [0.305; 0.449] 
Other firms ref. ref. 
Hypothesis H4 
Early adopters 3.03*** 3.12*** 
95% CI [2.401; 3.826] [2.510; 3.878] 
Late adopters ref. ref. 
Hypothesis H5 
Legislation existed 0.78* 0.80* 
95% CI [0.619; 0.991] [0.659; 0.975] 
No legislation ref. ref. 
Hypothesis H6 
strong network 4.61*** 1.24* 
95% CI [4.248; 5.007] [1.005; 1.521] 
weak network ref. ref. 
no network/ no information 1.89*** 3.38*** 
95% CI [1.766; 2.024] [2.532; 4.523] 
N 10,610 10,742 
Note: * if p < 0.05, ** if p < 0.01, *** if p < 0.001. Odds ratios are presented, 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses (95% 
CI). The dependent variable is the dummy delisted, the controls include dummies of industry sectors, countries and a dummy 
for OECD in the logit regression, and a set of dummies of industry sectors in the MMGLM.  
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